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A MASSACHUSETTS DEBACLE: 
GAGNON V. SHOBLOM 
Lester Brickman * 
In Gagnon v. Shoblom,^ a case widely noted in the news media^ 
and closely watched by the plaintiflFs' bar, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed the trial court's determination that a one-
third contingent fee amounting to $975,000, was outrageous and un­
conscionable. In an inerudite^ and iminformed'* opinion, the court 
upheld the one-third fee and eflFectively rejected the applicability of 
fiduciary principles and ethical rules to plaintiffs' lawyers' fees pro­
vided their clients did not object. The authoritativeness of the court's 
opinion is questionable.' Substantively, the decision rejects the 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
' Gagnon v. Shoblom, No. 88-2105 (Super. Ct. Hampden County Feb. 20, 1990), rev'd, 
409 Mass. 63 (1991). 
2 See, e.g.,Fees Out of Line?, NAT'L LAW J., Feb 12, 1990, at 6; Kennedy, Reduction in 
Lawyer's $975,000 Fee Is Unanimously Reversed by SIC, Boston Globe, Jan 11, 1991, at 42 
(city ed.); Bates, Key To The Courthouse, LAWYERS MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 1; Green, Judge 
Decides Big Lawyer Fee Is Out of Order, Wall St. J., September 9, 1990, at Bl, col. 6. 
2 The court did not discuss or otherwise indicate familiarity with contingent fee literature 
or case law or the issues raised therein. For an analysis of both the literature and case law, see 
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies-. Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmarkl, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989) [hereinafter Contingent Fees]. 
^ Since the client did not object to the one-third fee, the appeal by his attorney to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was ex parte in nature. The trial judge's opinion was 
not represented. The attorney's position was supported by amicus briefs filed by the Massa­
chusetts Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. The lack of 
opposition resulted in the court's being uninformed of opposing arguments. 
5 The ex parte nature of the appeal raises issues simU^ to those raised in In re Application 
of Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). The issue in Cooper broadly dealt with who had the authority to 
regulate the practice of law in New York: the courts or the legislature. More specifically, the 
issue was the validity of a legislative enactment providing that the graduates of Columbia Law 
School should be admitted to the bar without judicial examination. Id. at 87-95 (discussing 
the constitutionality of 1860 N.Y. Laws § 202). The lower court had decided that the act was 
unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature had encroached upon its judicial power to 
regulate the practice of law and refused to admit Cooper to the bar. In re the Graduates, 10 
Abb. Pr. 357 (Sup. Ct.) (Bonney, J.), rev'd sub nom. In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). Cooper 
was represented on appeal by Theodore Dwight. Dwight had reopened the Columbia School 
of Law in 1858 and constituted its whole faculty at the time. 3 A. CHESTER, COURTS AND 
LAWYERS OF NEW YORK; A HISTORY 1609-1925, at 1337 (1925). This appeal, too, was ex 
parte; no advocate opposed Dwight. The New York Court of Appeals opinion relied heavily 
on Dwight's self-interested brief and adopted much of it although it contained errors of fact, 
history and law. See Kennedy, Has The New York Legislature The Paramount Right To Regu­
late The Admission of Attorneys'} (pt. 1), 99 N. Y.L.J. 1 (April 6, 1938). See generally Lee, The 
Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to The Bar, 13 HARV. L. REV. 233, 240 
(1899). The ex parte nature of the appeal was later severely criticized by the New York 
Supreme Court. Justice Sutherland characterized the New York Court of Appeals action as an 
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court's own rules regulating the reasonableness of contingent fees® 
and errs in its mindless rejection of fiduciary principles and ethical 
rules. It should be rejected, as authority, by other courts considering 
the vahdity of a contingent fee. 
I. CONTINGENT FEES 
The contingent fee is a financing device which enables a client to 
assert a claim while limiting his exposure to loss though also limiting 
his potential gain.' The essence of the contingent fee is reward for 
risk.® The risk-sharing attorney claims a reward, which is eflFectively a 
multiple of his opportunity cost (hourly rate) for assuming the risks of 
losing the case and of having to devote substantially more time to the 
matter than anticipated. If risk is not borne, a reward for assuming 
that risk cannot be claimed; if there is no contingency, a lawyer may 
not charge a multiple of his opportunity cost. Stated simply, if there 
is no contingency, then a lawyer cannot charge a contingent fee.' 
Since only the existence of a realistic risk regarding effort and 
recovery justifies charging a premium for risk, it follows, a fortiori, 
that if there is risk, then the risk premium must be proportionate to 
the risk and anticipated effort.'" 
Charging a contingent fee percentage in a case involving little or 
no risk, which is designed to effectively yield double or triple the law­
yer's opportunity cost, or $400-600 per hour assuming an hourly rate 
of $200, is almost certainly unethic^" and illegal.'^ It is just as un­
ethical and illegal as a lawyer billing a client for fifty hours when he 
has only worked ten hours. Charging for a risk that is not being as­
sumed and charging for work not done are both fraudulent acts. An 
analysis of Gagnon indicates that though the lawyer charged a sub­
stantial risk premium, he assumed little risk. 
"extraordinary proceeding" which had "the appearance of a want of respect for law and or­
der." In re the Graduates, 11 Abb. Pr. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1860). When the issue of authority to 
regulate the practice of law was revisited by the New York Court of Appeals in Karlin v. 
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928), Chief Judge Cardozo restated the history of regu­
lation of the practice of law in England and New York. Id. at 471-77, 162 N.E. at 491-92. In 
essence, he rejected Dwight's historical argument that courts did not possess the power to 
regulate the practice of law, and in the process, corrected errors in Dwight's brief (available at 
the Columbia Law Library, call no. TC 782431), the Cooper court's opinion, see id., and rele­
gated In re Cooper to the briefest mention, id. at 477, 162 N.E. at 492. 
® See infra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
For an analysis of contingent fees, see Contingent Fees, supra note 3. 
8 See id. at 89-93, 117 (analysis of risk). 
9 Id. at 74-88. 
JO Id. at 94-99. 
J J Id. at 70-74; see also infra notes 45-60. 
J2 Id. at 51-70; see also infra notes 37-44. 
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II. GAGNON V SHOBLOM^^ 
A. The Facts 
On a clear, dry afternoon, the plaintiff, forty-four years old, 
stopped to assist a tractor-trailer which was stopped in the break­
down lane of the Massachusetts Turnpike. Plaintiff parked his truck 
in front of the disabled vehicle and went underneath it to attempt to 
help fix it. A loaded garbage truck owned by Browning-Ferris Indus­
tries, veered off the highway into the break-down lane and crashed 
into the tractor-trailer. The driver of the latter was killed and plaintiff 
sustained massive injuries, rendering him a paraplegic, paralyzed 
from the waist down with permanent loss of bowel and bladder con­
trol, of penile function, and requiring life-long medical care. Plaintiff 
retained an attorney and entered a one-third contingent fee 
agreement.^ "* 
A structured settlement was entered into with a present cash 
value of $2,925,000, yielding a fee of $975,000 to the attorney.'' Since 
this was a third-party action involving worker's compensation, the 
settlement had to be approved by a reviewing board or a court.'® The 
superior court judge of the court in which the action was filed felt that 
the amount of the fee was extremely high and held evidentiary hear­
ings on the fee." 
The judge found that the attorney had worked hard, thoroughly 
prepared, and presented the case well. Additionally, he achieved a 
very favorable result for which he was entitled to be "handsomely 
compensated.'"® However, under applicable court rules," the "rea­
sonableness" of a contingent fee was subject to review by a court of 
competent jurisdiction in light of the circumstances prevailing at the 
time the agreement was entered into, including the uncertainty of the 
compensation. The judge determined that at the time the contingent 
fee was entered, "the hability aspects . . . were very strong and [the] 
. . . injuries were probably catastrophic .... It was . . . highly prob­
able that he would ultimately receive either a very substantial judg­
ment or a very substantial settlement."^® Moreover, "it was obvious 
13 No. 88-2105 (Super. Ct. Hampden County Feb. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Superior Court 
Opinion], rev'd, 409 Mas*s. 63 (1991). 
Superior Court Opinion, supra note 13, at 1-3. 
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. at 10 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 152, § 15 (West 1988)). 
17 Id. at 4-5. 
18 Id. at 8. 
19 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:05, §§ 5(e), 6. 
20 Superior Court Opinion, supra note 13, at 4-5. The court noted that after the action had 
been commenced, defendants developed a "plausible defense"—that the driver was suffering 
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. . . that the case would probably culminate in a negotiated settlement 
. . . He then went on to state: 
I am satisfied (both on the basis of my own experience as a practic­
ing attorney and as a trial judge as well as by the evidence 
presented at the hearings) that in the case of a civil tort action in 
which damages are sought for personal injuries a contingent fee of 
33 1/3% of the amount recovered is reasonable to a point . . . .  
[HJowever,... as the size of the recovery (and hpnce the size of the 
fee) increases, the spread between the attorney's fee and the fair 
value of the time, eflFort and skill that he devoted to earning that fee 
widens—and at some point the fee becomes unreasonable and even 
(if the spread becomes wide enough) outrageous or unconsciona­
ble. . . . When as in this case the injury sustained by the client is 
catastrophic, the amount of the reduction [in the client's recovery 
due to his lawyer's fee] can become enormous .... [A]fter all, [it is 
the client and not the lawyer]... who must spend the remainder of 
his life confined to a wheelchair with no bowel or bladder control 
and with constant dependence upon others to assist him in the nor­
mal tasks of day-to-day hving. In a case such as this it is not rea­
sonable to apply the 33 1/3% rate. . . . 
In summary . . . [the attorney] had a very good case from the 
beginning. He had a strong case of liability, catastrophic damages, 
and a defendant with the financial wherewithal to pay almost any 
judgment that might be obtained. In addition, he had the benefit of 
the workmen's compensation act which meant that his client's 
medical expenses would be paid and that the client would be pro­
vided with sufficient income to survive while the third party action 
was pending, so pressure for a quick settlement was not nearly as 
intense as it would have been had no compensation benefits been 
available. It was very nearly an ideal case from the point of view of 
a plaintiff's trial attorney?^ 
After rejecting the attorney's argument that the $975,000 fee was 
reasonable in light of the amount of time devoted,the judge then 
from obstructive sleep apnea—^but that the lawyer "through preparation and research" met 
that challenge, id. at 5, and that despite the theory advanced by defendsmts, the plaintiff's case 
remained a strong one, id. at 7. 
21 Id. at 7-8. 
22 Id. at 11-14 (emphasis supplied). 
23 Although the attorney did not keep time records, he did produce an estimate of the time 
he and his staff had devoted: 2,659.75 hours and 1,973.50 hours respectively. The judge 
responded: 
I frankly find those estimates to be somewhat generous .... The issues involved, 
both legal and factual, were not so complex as to justify what would have 
amounted to devotion of nearly all of [the attorney's] own time for over a year, 
plus a substantial period of his staff's time, to a single case. 
Id. at 6. Moreover, the judge continued, though not so informed by the attorney, he had 
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reduced the fee to $695,000.^'* 
B. Analysis of the Superior Court's Decision 
The determination to reduce the one-third fee by 28.7% to 
23.76% of the settlement value was predicated on the unreasonable­
ness of the one-third fee. After analyzing risk factors the court con­
cluded that: it was apparent at the time of contracting that a 
multimillion dollar verdict was highly likely; the defendant had deep 
pockets; the client's medical and hving expenses were being provided 
for while the action was pending; and that this was very nearly an 
ideal case.^® However, the court failed to carry its analysis to the ob­
vious conclusion to which its analysis inexorably led. Instead of 
branding the amount of the fee as unreasonable, the court should have 
said: 
The attorney is limited to a fee commensurate with the 
risk he assumed. The court determines that the risk home 
by the attorney at the time of entering into the retainer 
agreement was negligible and the substantial risk premium 
being charged violated both fiduciary law and ethical princi­
ples. Therefore the fee shall be reduced to an amount pro­
portionate to the risk the attorney assumed. 
Since it was apparent at the time of contracting that a 
recovery of at least $2,500,000 was to be anticipated, that it 
was highly likely that the claim would be settled rather than 
tried, that the attorney would likely have to devote 500 
hours to the matter, and that a fee of $250 per hour would 
generously compensate the attorney for the neghgible risk 
he was assuming, a fee of $125,000 was appropriate. There­
fore, the percentage that the attorney can legitimately 
charge is 5.0% ($125,000 divided by $2,500,000)." How­
ever, to build in additional protection for the attorney, in 
learned that the attorney had also been retained to represent the estate of the driver of the 
tractor-trailer and the driver's mother, that that work done was undoubtedly included in the 
time estimates prepared by the attorney, that these claims had already been settled, and that 
the attorney had received a substantial but undisclosed fee for these services. Id. at 6-7. He 
also noted that the attorney had indicated expenses of $72,000 for both sets of representation, 
mainly for production of a video tape for use as a negotiating tool which cost was to come out 
of the attorney's fees. Id. The judge did not indicate if he had inquired whether the attorney 
had represented any other clients or devoted time to any other matter that year; according to 
the attorney's time estimate, he could not have done so unless he was an insomniac. 
24 The judge found that a fee of 33 1/3% of the first $300,000, 25% of the next $1,200,000 
and 20% of all amounts in excess of $1,500,000 would be reasonable. Id. at 15. 
23 Id. at 11-14. 
26 See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 94-99. 
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light of costs to be advanced, the court sets the contingent 
fee at 10%, which is designed to generate a fee of $250,000, 
or an hourly rate of $500. 
Instead of such an analysis, the court resorted to a form of gas­
tronomic jurisprudence: I know an unreasonable fee when I see it" 
and deep down in my gut, I know that $975,000 is too high a fee given 
what occurred.^ ® 
The failure of the court to apply the doctrihally supportable, in­
tellectual construct of the relationship between risk and reward for 
risk, between contingency and contingent fee,^ ' and to use instead an 
idiosyncratic expression of reasonableness, left its decision highly vul­
nerable to the depredations of the trial bar.^ ° 
C. Gagnon Before the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
In a unanimous decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed the lower court and awarded the attorney the entire 
$975,CXX) fee.^ ' Interpreting Massachusetts law, it concluded that the 
purpose of subjecting the settlement of a third-party action to judicial 
review did not include protecting the client's interests. 
As for its own rule requiring that a contingent fee be reason­
able,^  ^ the court held that the rule did not apply "because no one is 
challenging the contingent fee agreement."^"  ^ The court recognized 
that even without its rule requiring that a contingent fee be reason­
able, courts had inherent power to review a fee for reasonableness. 
However, that power could only be exercised if the fee was challenged 
by a party. The Massachusetts court's contention that a contingent 
fee's reasonableness is insulated from review if the client does not ob­
ject is without support in Massachusetts or any other jurisdiction.^ ® 
27 With apologies to Justice Potter Stewart. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
28 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
29 See generally Contingent Fees, supra note 3. 
20 The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief noted; "The ruling 
below reflects little more than the judge's personal notion of reasonableness . . .." Massachu­
setts Academy of Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 11, Gagnon v. Sh-
ablom, 409 Mass. 63 (1991) (No. 5399). The opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court reflects the effectiveness of this characterization of the lower court's opinion as idiosyn­
cratic rather than principled. 
21 Gagnon v. Shablon, 409 Mass. 63 (1991). 
22 Id. at 66. 
22 Id. at 66-67. 
3* Id. at 67. 
25 Id. 
26 A modicum of support for the court's position that a client complaint is a sine qua non 
for the application of fiduciary law and ethical rules to attorney fees may be found in United 
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It is wrong as a matter of law, policy, and ethics. 
III. FIDUCIARY LAW 
Lawyers, as fiduciaries for their clients,^ ' are held to a faimess-
States V. Vague, 521 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. 111. 1981), rev'd, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983). In 
Vague, United States District Court Judge John F. Grady ordered a criminal defendant's at­
torney to return part of the fee that he had collected from defendant on the ground that the fee 
was exorbitant. The defendant and a codefendant were indicted for possession of, and, con­
spiring to possess, goods stolen from O'Hare Airport. After some procedural skirmishing, 
both defendants agreed to a plea bargain. In reading the presentence report. Judge Grady 
learned that the defendant's attorney had charged a fee of $12,000. Upon further inquiry, he 
determined that the attorney had put in, at most, forty hours of work beneficial to his client of 
which about two-thirds had been spent in listening to tape recording of electronic surveil­
lance. Also, he learned that the codefendant's lawyer had charged his client $1,250. Judge 
Grady then limited the defendant's attorney to a fee of $2,500 and when the attorney refused 
to refund any amount below $8,000 adjudged him in civil contempt. 
Judge Grady is one of very few judges who has demonstrated a persistent willingness to 
..Taminff attorney's fees and to order their reduction when they violate fiduciary and etUcal 
rules. He is particularly outspoken about contingent fee abuses. See Grady, Some Ethical 
Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LITIGATION 20 (Summer 1976). (He is joined m this re­
gard by United States District Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York. See 
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff d, 818 F.2d 
226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988)). 
On appeal of the Vague judgment, the attorney argued that his fee arrangement was none 
of the court's business since his client did not complain about the fee. Although Judge P^er 
writing for the Seventh Circuit found that position "untenable," Vague, 697 F.2d at 806, a 
closer reading of his opinion reflects otherwise. In finding in favor of the attorney. Judge 
Posner stated: "A judge cannot be made to approve an unethical transaction, but the district 
judge ... was not asked to do any such thing; he was just asked to decide . . . [defendant's] 
punishment for a crime. To reach the fee question the judge had to start a separate proceed­
ing." Id. at 808. Since defendant has "yet to raise a peep about the fee that the district judp 
has so vigorously denounced as excessive ... we cannot find any basis for what the judge ^ d in 
this case . . . ." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, instead of ordering a fee reduction in re­
sponse to the ethical violation, the trial judge should have reported the unethical conduct to 
the disciplinary authorities. 
In dissent. Judge Grant pointed out that the court had sustain^ Judge Grady's reducfaon 
of attorney fees in another case even though the parties had not objected to the fee. Id. at 809 
(citing Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982)). More imimrtantly. Judge 
Grant noted that other circuits had sustained a trial court's inherent authority to supervise 
attorney's fees. /d. at 1111. Indeed, it is universally held that a judge has the inherent power 
to supervise attorney fees in matters before the court. Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 39 
n.42, 56 n.97. ,. . . ^ 
Judge Posner*s response to Judge Grant*s well-supported proposition that judges have 
inherent power to regulate fees in matters before them was to ignore the point. Moreover, 
Judge Grady's sua sponte fee reduction was not a disciplinary response to violation of the rules 
of professional ethics, but rather one based on the lawyer's breach of the fiduciary obligation to 
the client to charge no more than a fair fee. For a discussion of fiduciary obligation, see infra 
notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
37 See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1, at 146 (1986). This Article prints 
an abbreviated discussion of the fiduciary obligation of a lawyer. For a fuller analysis, see 
Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44-70, and Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dis­
senting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 284 n.41 [hereinafter Fee Arbitration]. 
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in-fact" standard, which is a higher and less self-interested standard 
than is appUed to commercial transactants.^® Under this standard, it 
is the attorney's obligation to give the same advice to his chent in 
matters aflFecting the relationship as the client would have received 
had he sought the advice of a second lawyer.^® The faimess-in-fact 
standard mandates that the attorney cannot use his superior knowl­
edge or position to take advantage of the chent."^ The standard is 
violated, regardless of intent, whenever an attorney's action benefits 
the attorney, is not in the best interests of the client and the client has 
not given his informed consent."^' 
The faimess-in-fact standard applies to the attorney-client fee 
transaction."*^ As a matter of fiduciary law, an attorney is not permit­
ted to charge in excess of a reasonable fee."*^ Even if the chent con­
sents to the fee, but an informed and knowledgeable client would not 
have entered into the fee agreement, then the lawyer has likely 
breached the fiduciary standard."*^ 
Fee Arbitration, supra note 37, at 284 n.43. 
39 Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. Jun. 266, 278, 31 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1050 (Ch. 1801); see also. Fee 
Arbitration, supra note 37, at 284 n.43. 
^ See Whitehead v. Kennedy, 69 N.Y. 462, 466 (1877). 
Fee Arbitration, supra note 37, at 285 nn.48-49, 288 n.60. 
« Id. at 287 n.57. 
^3 See Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub 
nam. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kiser, the district court stated; 
[A]n attorney is entitled to no more than a reasonable fee, no matter what fee is 
specified in the contract, because an attorney, as a fiduciary, cannot bind his client 
to pay a greater compensation for his services than the attorney would have the 
right to demand if no contract had been made. 
Id at 1319; see also G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 99 (1978) ("A contract 
for a [legal] fee is, under general principles of law, a contract between a fiduciary and his 
protected dependent. .. [and] it is unenforceable unless its terms are fair to the client."); 520 
E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989); Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 4855, 496 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 713 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983). 
^ Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 51 n.88. When a client "consents" to an excessive fee, 
a rebuttable presumption is raised that the client has not comprehended the agreement. See 
Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 106, 160 N.E.2d 43, 48, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 498 ("[T]he amount of 
the fee, standing alone and unexplained, may be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage 
was taken of the client . . . ."), modified, 6 N.Y.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d 736, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951 
(1959), appeal dismissed and cert denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960); High Point Casket Co. v. 
Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 467, 109 S.E. 378, 383-84 (1921) (contingent fee percentage alone can 
show that unfair advantage has been taken of client); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 
352 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986) (client agreed to pay contingent fee exceeding risk of 
nonrecovery though he could afford to pay hourly fee and was informed of the hourly fee 
choice and risk; the court assumed the client did not understand discussion of risk and had not 
given "fully informed consent"); see also Kiser, 364 F. Supp. at 1319; Florida Bar v. Moriber, 
314 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla. 1975); In re Kutner, 78 lU. 2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979); Cooper & 
Keys V. Bell, 127 Tenn. 142, 153 S.W. 844 (1913); of. Klemm v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 
893, 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1977) ("As a matter of law a purported consent to dual 
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IV. ETHICAL OBLIGATION'^' 
Much of the law of professional responsibility is a codification of 
fiduciary doctrine.'^  Thus, the ethical duty that prohibits lawyers 
from "enter[ing] into an agreement for, charging], or collecting] an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee'"^  ^derives from the fiduciary faimess-in-
fact standard. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize the validity 
of contingent fees.'^ ® The ethical justification for these approvals nec­
essarily lies in the assumption that the lawyer's risk of receiving no 
fee, or a fee that effectively will be below his hourly rate, merits com­
pensation in and of itself; bearing risk entitles the lawyer to a com­
mensurate risk premium.'*' 
If a lawyer charges a premium for risk which he is not assuming, 
that conduct is illegal and unethical. It is illegal because it violates 
the lawyer's fiduciary duty to deal fairly with clients.'" Since the con­
duct is illegal, it is therefore unethical.'* 
representation of litigants with adverse interests at a contested hearing would be neither intelli­
gent nor informed."); Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 140 Misc. 2d 288, 289, 530 N.Y.S.2d 
486, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1988). In Schenck, a lawyer hired to sue another lawyer for malpractice 
was binniflf a potential defendant in the same action and obtained client consent to waive the 
conflict of interest. In disqualifying the lawyer, the court said, "[T]he consent obtained in this 
case does not reflect a full understanding of the legal rights being waived |T]he unsophisti­
cated client, relying upon the confidential relationship with his lawyer, may not be regarded as 
able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much explained to him." Id. at 
289-91, 530 N.Y.S.2d. at 487 (citations omitted); see also Wade v. Clemmons, 84 Misc. 2d 822, 
826, 377 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1975) (striking down contingent fee because 
client, if properly advised, would have refused to agree to settlement offer yielding fee but no 
client recovery). But cf. Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 485-86, 63 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (1933) 
(no evidence of fraud or undue influence existed in making of contract in spite of defendant s 
lack of legal background). 
45 This Article presents an abbreviated discussion of the ethical considerations surrounding 
lawyers' fees. For a fuller analysis, see Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44 n.65, 70-74; Fee 
Arbitration, supra note 37, at 289-92. 
46 Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44 n.65. 
47 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1981) [hereinafter 
MODEL CODE]. The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983) [hereinaf­
ter MODEL RULES] restates the requirement as follows: "A lawyers's fee shall be reasonable." 
The Model Code's comparison in Rule 1.5 indicates that the only intended deviation from 
MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B) is the additional factor of the client's ability to pay, allowing 
courts to consider subsequent events in determining whether a fee is excessive. 
48 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 5-103(A)(2); MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule 
1.5(c); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521 
(1986). 
49 Pennslyvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting): "In the private market, lawyers charge a premium when their en­
tire fee is contingent on winning.... The premium ... compensates for the risk of nonpayment 
if the suit does not succeed . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). 
50 Supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
51 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 2-106(A), DR 1-102(A)(1); MODEL RULES, supra 
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It is also unethical because by charging for a service that was not 
provided, the lawyer is "engaging] in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."^^ Such conduct is also unethical 
because charging a contingent fee grossly disproportionate to any re­
alistic risk of nonrecovery would amount to charging a "clearly exces­
sive" and "unreasonable fee."^^ Accordingly, a lawyer who charged a 
one-third contingent fee in all cases, regardless of diflFering risks, 
would be charging an "illegal or clearly excessiVe" and "unreasonable 
fee" in those cases where there was little or no risk of nonrecovery or 
of greatly increased eflFort."* 
The lawyer's obligation to deal fairly with the client is also mani­
fested in the requirement that the client give informed consent to all 
important decisions.®' For consent, including consent to the fee ar-
note 47, Rule 8.4 comment; see also Martin, When Are Fees Unconscionable?, CAL. LAW., 
Jime 1988, at 88 ("A fee is illegal if it violates a . . . public policy."). 
MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 1-102(A)(4); see also Committee on Legal Ethics v. 
Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that misrepresenting the difficulty of 
collecting proceeds to justify an excessive fee violates DR 1-102(A)(4)). A lawyer charging for 
a risk that was not assumed is the functional equivalent of a lawyer charging for hours of work 
that were not performed. 
53 Supra note 47; see also In re Mercer, 126 Ariz. 274, 277-78, 614 P.2d 816, 819 (1980) 
(holding that the inclusion of worker's compensation payment in contingent fee bill is a charge 
for which no services were performed and therefore is clearly excessive and violative of DR 2-
106); Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 114 ("In the absence of any real risk, an attorney's purportedly 
contingent fee which is grossly disproportionate to the amount of work required is a 'clearly 
excessive fee' within the meaning of Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A)."); G. HAZARD & W. HODES, 
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON­
DUCT 74-75 (1985) (stating that contingent fee is unreasonable where risk of nonrecovery 
under given facts is negligible); 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 2.2, at 94 (1973), cited with 
approval in People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 (Colo. 1984) (holding that a contingent fee 
should not be fixed so high that it ceases to measure due compensation for professional services 
and makes lawyer "a partner or proprietor in the law suit"); Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 
71-72. 
A typical argument in support of a standard contingent fee is that it overcompensates 
lawyers in some cases in order to make up for the unsuccessful cases. See, e.g., Romano v. 
Lubin, 365 Pa. Super. 627, 631, 530 A.2d 487, 488 (1987) ("When the court calculates the fee 
of a plaintiff's attorney, it must consider that the very same attorney may have spent 
thousands of uncompensated hours working on other cases"); Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee 
Arrangements: Regulation and Review, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 82 (1980) ("the individ­
ual clients whose cases result in large recoveries pay more for their legal services than they 
might otherwise, in order to protect their attorney/insurer against the losses he has suffered 
and will continue to suffer from other cases"); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys'Fees: What is 
"Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 324-25 (1977), quoted in Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 
261, 265, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (1981). This Article rejects that argument. Overcharging violates 
the lawyer's fiduciary and ethical obligations to the client. In every contingent fee case, a 
lawyer may charge a risk premium that will compensate for the risks borne by the lawyer in 
that case. Success or failure in other cases is irrelevant to the fiduciary and ethical issues. 
55 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 7-8 (as fiduciary, the "lawyer should exert his best 
efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of 
relevant considerations"); MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule 1.4(b) ("[A] lawyer «HAII ex-
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rangement to be "informed," the client must not only be given the 
relevant information'® but must also comprehend it." 
The cUent, therefore, must be given the option of whether to pay 
a contingent, hourly, or fixed fee'® and has the right to be informed in 
a non-self-interested manner by the lawyer" regarding which option 
represents the client's, not the lawyer's, best interest.®" 
plain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci­
sions regarding the representation"); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 7-7 ("it is for 
the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer"); MODEL RULES, supra note 47, 
Rule 1.2(a). See generally Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent 
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (arguing that the doctrine of informed 
consent should be applied to the lawyer-client relationship). The correlative duty of the lawyer 
to disclose all material information to the client comes from the law of agency. See F. 
MECHAM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 541 (4th ed. 1952); cf RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957). 
56 See. e.g., Bumham v. Heselton, 84 Me. 578, 20 A. 80 (1890) (after determining that 
payment of a $250 note was assured, but not disclosing that information to the client, lawyer 
hired to collect the note proposed and client accepted fee of aU collected proceeds above $75; 
struck down because the lawyer had not informed the client of all material facts bearing on the 
appropriateness of the fee known to the lawyer); Kickland v. Egan, 36 SJ3. 428,439,155 N.W. 
192, 195 (1915) (lawyer should have advised the client before bargaining for fee that services 
would be nominal because another firm was representing the estate and would be doing most 
of the work; therefore, one-third contingent fee of the amount client was to receive was struck 
down). "Only after ... disclosure [of all fee information] is given can a client's consent to pay 
a certain fee be considered truly voluntary." 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 53, at 71. 
57 Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 67 n.l30; see also supra note 44. 
58 MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule 1.5 comment ("When there is doubt whether a 
contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest, the lawyer should offer the client 
alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications."). The requirement that the lawyer 
must extend the option to the client to pay an hourly rate is implicit in the Ethical Considera­
tions of the MODEL CODE, supra note 47, the comment to Rule 1.5, and the fiduciary require­
ment that the lawyer deal fairly with prospective or actual clients. See ABA Comm. on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521 (1986); see also In re Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319, 
403 A.2d 873 (1979); Estate of Vafiades v. Sheppard Bus Serv. Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 301, 469 
A.2d 971 G^.J. Super, A. Law Div. 1983); MICH CT. R. 8.121(E) ("An attorney must advise a 
c l i en t ,  be fo re  en te r ing  a  con t ingen t  f ee  a r rangement ,  t ha t  a t to rneys  may  be  employed  under . . .  
hourly or per diem basis."); N.J. CT. R. l:21-7(b) ("An attorney shall not enter into a contin­
gent fee arrangement without first having advised the client of the right and afforded the client 
an opportunity to retain him under an arrangement whereby he would be compensated on the 
basis of the reasonable value of his services."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.013(2) (West 1980 & 
Supp. 1988) (in a malpractice action, attorney must offer client option of paying on a per diem 
or hourly basis). 
59 Supra notes 38-39.^ 
60 520 E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728, 738 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989); MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 2-20 
("a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis ... [if his 
client] is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee . . .[but] where justified by the particular circum­
stances of a case [it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer] to enter into a contingent fee 
contract. . . with ... [a] client who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires 
that arrangement"); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 5-7; MODEL RULES, supra note 
47, Rule 1.5 comment; 2 E. THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 743 (1914) ("Attorneys, in 
entering into contracts of employment with clients, are required to exercise the highest order 
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V. GAGNON, FIDUCIARY LAW AND ETHICAL OBLIGATION 
Application of the fiduciary and ethical principles explicated in 
this Article leads to the conclusion that the one-third fee charged in 
Gagnon was illegal and unethical. 
The attorney did not: oflFer the client the option of paying an 
hourly rate; inform the client that it was in the client's best interest 
that he be retained on an hourly rate; inform the client that there was 
very little risk of nonrecovery and that a multimillion dollar recovery 
was highly likely; or inform the client that a one-third contingent fee 
would likely yield the attorney a fee of at least one thousand doUars 
per hour. 
For the court to exclude fiduciary and ethical requirements be­
cause the client did not complain of the fee is to disregard the fiduci­
ary and ethical requirement of informed consent.®' For the court to 
fail to even discuss the applicable fiduciary and ethical principles re­
quires no characterization; only a concurring opinion by Justice 
Greaney even acknowledges that the issue of risk is germane to the 
ethical and legal validity of a contingent fee.®^ That acknowledgment, 
however, did not rise to the level of acknowledging a client's recipro­
cal fiduciary and ethical rights when charged a one-third contingent 
fee.®^ 
VI. "MONEY MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND"®^ 
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to ef-
of good faith ... disclosing all information ... as to facts which would or might influence him 
either in entering into, or refusing to execute the contract."). The lawyer has a fiduciary duty 
"to present fairly and fully the nature of what he might be called upon to do in the prospective 
lawsuit and the nature of his representation, the values at stake, and the likelihood of success." 
Id. 
In a possible passing gesture at informed consent, the court stated that the client had 
"intelligently and freely testified that he was satisfied with the amount of the fee." Gagnon v. 
Shoblom, 409 Mass. 63, 67 (1991). It is unclear what the court meant by "intelligently." 
When viewed from the perspective of the principles elucidated in this Article, the client was 
not intelligent with regard to the degree he had been taken advantage of by his attorney. See 
infra text accompanying notes 72-74. 
Gagnon, 409 Mass. at 69-72 & n.l (Greaney, J., concurring). Justice Greaney therein 
states; 
At a time when the gap between the service and the [contingent] fee in tort cases 
appears to be becoming more and more pronounced, there may be a need to estab-
hsh a better sense of proportion. This case is illustrative of the problem. The 
question raised by the [trial] judge deserves honest debate. 
Id. at 72 (footnote omitted). 
"[T]he one-third percentage has become institutionalized in the practice of the litigation 
bar as the minimum rate to be charged in the typical tort case. Change, if it is to come, should 
not come suddenly and to the disappointment of long-standing expectations." Id. at 70. 
Money, CABARET (lyrics by Fred Ebb). 
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fectively narrow the reach of fiduciary principles and ethical rules re­
lating to contingent fees was strongly supported by the Massachusetts 
Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Lawyers.®^ 
The trial judges's reduction of the fee from $975,CXX) to $695,000 was 
not, of course, a simple matter of a $280,000 differential.®® It 
portended millions of dollars in reduced fees in the future,®^ especially 
in view of the fact that lawyers routinely charge substantial contin­
gent fees in cases in which there is insubstantial risk. Indeed, contin­
gent fees in personal injury cases yield plaintiffs' lawyers enormous 
sums of money—in the range of $13 billion annually.®® Plaintiffs' 
lawyers have used this wealth to purchase considerable influence in 
Congress, thwarting all legislation that might conceivably threaten 
their fee interests.®' By one estimate, these contributions, in toto, ex­
ceed all other single-issue contributions in national pohtics.^° In view 
of the above realities, and the serious abuses that exist in the area of 
contingent fees," courts should exercise extreme care in discharging 
their responsibilities to clients. Simply noting that the cUent has not 
objected to the one-third fee does not discharge that responsibUity. 
Moreover, the chent in Gagnon indicated that he had interviewed sev­
eral other law firms; all had quoted him the same one-third contingent 
fee.'^ Obviously, he could have only concluded that a one-third fee 
was the industry standard—as indeed it is.'® Accordingly, the client 
See supra note 4. 
The decision in this case could affect attorney's fees in every action in courts of this 
Commonwealth where there is a contingency fee agreement. Many of the state­
ments ... [by the lower court] could be deemed to apply to a wide range of 
situations beyond the case that was specifically before him. 
Brief for Massachusetts Bar Association, Thirteen County Bar Associations, and Women's Bar 
Association, as Amici Curiae in support of Appellant at 12, Gagnon (No. 5399). 
I have recently testified at a fairness hearing before a representative of United States 
District Judge Jack Weinstein about a reduction of plaintiffs' attorney fees in claims before the 
Manville Personal Injury Trust. Testimony of Lester Brickman (Fairness Hearing), Findley v. 
Blinken {In re Johns Manville), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B11676 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 
1991) (CA 90-3973). I proposed that a reduction, not from the prevailing rate averaging 
thirty-five percent but rather from the proposed limitation of twenty-five percent, to $250 an 
hour or $75 an hour more than the average hourly rate charged by defendants' attorneys in 
asbestos cases, would save the Manville fund as much as $250 million over the life of the fund. 
68 Income from contingent fees in personal injury cases exceeded $10 billion dollars in 
1985. Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 76 n.l86. Adjusting that to 1991 dollars and adding a 
component to reflect the enormous contingent fees being generated by asbestos litigation yields 
an amount in excess of $13 billion dollars. 
69 See Moore, Trial Lawyers on Trial, 49 NAT'L J. 2962 (Dec. 8, 1990); England, Congress, 
Nader and the Ambulance Chasers, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 18. 
'o England, supra note 69, at 18. 
•'I See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 113, 127-28. 
'2 Affidavit of Donald Gagnon at 3 (Jan. 7, 1989), Gagnon (No. 5399). 
'3 "[T]he one-third percentage has become institutionalized in the practice of the litigation 
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would likely not have regarded the one-third fee unfair since that was 
what all lawyers apparently charged. However, if all the price infor­
mation that the client was provided with was the contingent fee per­
centage, he was not in the position to give his informed consent.'^ 
Unless the chent is informed of the projected hourly rate that the con­
tingent fee is designed to yield, he simply is not in a position to com­
prehend what he is really being charged. Moreover, by sustaining the 
one-third fee, courts are lending their imprimatur to price-fixing. For 
over one hundred years, lawyers have successfully sought to insulate 
themselves from market forces. A central feature of all codes of ethics 
and other bar association regulations of lawyer conduct has been the 
restraint on price competition. Despite United States Supreme Court 
intervention,'^ the institutional conditions necessary to a competitive 
market do not yet exist in the legal services context. This is most 
especially true for contingent fees. The evidence that contingent fees 
yield more than competitive rates of return is far-ranging.'® The in­
dustry standard one-third fee did not result from the operation of 
competitive market forces but rather from poUtical decisions." But 
for these pohtical decisions, the industry standard today would be 
fifty percent.'® A court does not effectuate its responsibilities to cli­
ents by joining with the bar" to enforce the current industry standard 
against chents. 
The courts as guardians of clients' correlative fiduciary and ethi­
cal rights should reject Gagnon v. Shoblom as the industry standard 
for judicial regulation of contingent fees. Sed quis custodiet ipsos 
Custodesl^ 
bar as the minimum rate to be charged in the typical tort case." Gagnon, 409 Mass at 70 
(Greaney, J., concurring); see also Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 100 n.280. 
Supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
'5 See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. State Bar, 433 
U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 103-11. 
" Id. at 106-107. 
78 Id. 
7' As evidence that a one-third fee was reasonable, the court noted that "a leading member 
of the bar who specializes in prosecuting personal injury claims for plaintiflfs testified as to the 
reasonableness of the fee." Gagnon, 409 Mass. at 64. 
80 JUVENAL, VI SATIRES line 347, quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, at 
122) (E. Beck 15th ed. 1980) ("But who is to guard the guards themselves?"). To which Plato, 
in effect responded 300 years earlier: "What an absurd idea—a guardian to need a guardian!" 
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 3, 403-E (quoted in J. BARTLETT, supra, at 122). Today, the 
idea is no longer absurd. 
